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The Broken Mirror: 
Dissolution of the Subject 
and Multiple Personality 
Pirandello and Late Nineteenth-
Century French Psychopathology 
Remo Bodei 
I 
1. I suggest we consider the genesis of the subject and of its 
crisis in contemporary culture starting from a path, not yet 
explored and not devoid of surprises, that will take us from scien-
tific and psychopathological models to philosophy and literature. 
The distant starting point in the nineteenth century is physiol-
ogy, and in particular cytology. With the discovery by Matthias 
Jacob Schleien and Theodor Schwamm of the cell as the fundamen-
tal unit of the organism, and with Rudolf Vierchow' s claim that 
[Translated from the Italian by Bruno Martini and Peter Carravetta] 
DIFFERENT/A 2 (Spring 1988) 
DIFFERENT/A 44 
every cell originates from another cell (Omnis cellula a cellula, 1855), 
cellular theory becomes the most influential model of explanation 
for the phenomena of life. In this context two questions were 
repeatedly raised: how does one pass from the monocellular to 
the multicellular organisms? And, how do the cells in the multicel-
lular organisms connect and interact among themselves? 1 Such 
questions quickly extend beyond physiology and are applied in 
an analogous manner to other scientific disciplines [scienze] or 
fields of knowledge [saperi]. The transition from monocellular to 
multicellular organisms is thus interpreted (according to Spence-
rian models) as an evolution from the simple to the complex, from 
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. But since the state of 
equilibrium reached by the composites is unstable, the more com-
plex the organism and the more differentiated its cells, the more 
it will be exposed to dissolution. For Spencer, dissolution and trans-
ience [labilita] make up destiny, be it of organisms as well as of 
complex human societies. 2 When an organism or a society is con-
fronted by challenges it cannot resolve since it has not yet achieved 
a certain level of evolutionary differentiation, i.e., when it is not 
capable of going one step further in its level of complexity, at that 
point-since it cannot stand still-it turns back, it breaks up into 
simpler and more primitive aggregates. Evolution and dissolution 
are complementary terms: any organism and any society incapable 
of development is destined to regress to previously achieved 
levels. That which is older-since it is simpler, more elementary, 
not composite-is also more persistent and lasting. In other words: 
the past is stronger than the present and the future and can thus con-
dition, in a significant though subtle way, the unfolding of organic, 
psychic, and social events. 
In the field of physiology the transition from the simple to 
the complex takes the form of a "crescendo" of coordination among 
the various cells which are gradually deprived of their indepen-
dence and placed under a centralized command. From the cell 
qua individual one progresses to more complex organisms. 3 
Not surprisingly, legal and political terminology is applied to 
physiology even before politics can utilize some of its results. The 
power of the single cells, it is said, is "confiscated" in favor of a 
"hegemonic" center, whose delegated task is the coordination of 
the plurality of cells which are to be assembled in colonies.4 This 
holds true not only for the single organisms, but also for the living 
creatures that dwell in groups, like the coral polyps, polypes agreges 
or corallaires a polypier. These little animals have had the dubious 
fortune of becoming for some decades paradigm cases, of provid-
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ing a model used in various ways, as can be seen in Espina's book 
Des societes animales; Etude de psychologie comparee (Paris, 1877) or 
in Perrier' s book, Les colonies animales et la formation des organismes 
(Paris, 1881). 
In these as well as in various other succeeding works, we see 
how each individual of the colony surrenders and confers [deleghi] 
its rudimentary functions of "consciousness" to a system of coor-
dination that transcends the single organism. In such fashion a 
collective consciousness is generated as tout de coalition, resulting 
from the aggregation of a multiplicity of individual conscious-
nesses which have given up their sovereignty and have placed 
themselves under the protection and the control of a central or-
ganism. Such a center cannot exist, nor have any autonomy, out-
side of the system of delegations permitted by the single elements 
of which it is composed . 
2. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, this pattern 
is applied-with revolutionary results-to the field of 
psychopathology by three medecins-philosophes, who carried great 
weight in the culture of their time: Theodoule Ribot, Pierre Janet 
and Alfred Binet. Today their names are nearly forgotten by the 
general public, but they were famous among their contemporaries 
and their books were enormously successful and were sold by 
the thousands. Yet traces remain even in contemporary culture, 
through the effects which they have directly or indirectly pro-
duced: various aspects of the works of Bergson, Sorel, Le Bon, 
Freud, Pirandello and Proust would be unthinkable without their 
teaching. Theodoule Ribot in Les maladies de la memoire, Les maladies 
de la volonte and Les maladies de la personnalite, published in Paris 
in the years 1881, 1883 and 1885 respectively; Pierre Janet in L'au-
tomatisme psychologique (Paris, 1889); and Alfred Binet in Les alter-
ations de la personnalite, which appeared in Paris in 1892, 5 contrib-
uted, in the field of human psychology, to the overturning of 
widespread conceptions of common sense and of well-rooted re-
ligious and philosophical traditions. Through their research, the 
I, the soul, consciousness ceases to be a monolithic unit, a simple sub-
stance, and becomes an unstable aggregate, an archipelago of poles of 
consciousness, of II ilots de conscience, 11 a II conscience de coalition" not 
unlike that of the coral polyps. 
From the psychological standpoint, the consciousness of indi-
viduals considered normal is only the strongest, not the only one. 
Its hegemony is based on a coalition, on a system of alliances and 
psychic equilibriums that is not natural, but construed, and which 
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demands a continuous expenditure of energy. But since what is 
most recent and more complex in the evolution of the species is 
also the most transient, the "conscience de coalition" not capable of 
developing beyond certain levels of greater complexity is liable to 
dissolution. Incapable of making progress, it thus falls back onto 
more elementary forms of organization. Such assertions bring 
about a crucial cultural turning point, a change of paradigm and 
a true Gestalt-switch in the way one looks at consciousness and at 
the individual. The individual, for example, used to be conceived, 
literally, as indivisible, endowed with a soul or a psychic apparatus 
similar to a hard kernel, compact, immutable in its essence and, 
according to some conceptions of religious derivation, immortal. 
The growth of the individual from infancy to a mature age was 
in fact understood as an e-ducation, that is, etymologically, a draw-
ing out of what was already implicit in it. Now instead, for the 
first time, it is believed that science and experience demonstrate 
that the individual is "dividual," divisible and composite. 
But another decisive consequence can be drawn from the 
preceding premises. What is phylogenetically or ontogenetically 
more atavistic or old becomes in fact-according to this model-
stronger, firmer and more solid than what is more recent, younger 
and hence brittle. Because of this, when the individual is unable 
to face up to new and difficult situations, the cerebral cortex (which 
phylogenetically is a recent conquest and the seat of the superior 
faculties such as intelligence, memory, will) is hit first. And since 
for Ribot, following Spinoza, body and soul are nothing but un 
phenomene a double face, lesions of the cerebral cortex are responsible 
for maladies of the personality, of will and memory. The person-
ality splits into independent and contrasting entities. The whole of 
coalition crumbles: the sovereign [egemone] consciousness is forced 
to abdicate and the federation of souls dissolves. The partial and 
multiple consciousnesses resume their autonomy. Thus there 
arises mental illness, with a process comparable to a sort of resto-
ration of feudal anarchy, formerly abolished by a centralized 
power but which subsequently proved powerless to govern. The 
implicit mandate is withdrawn: one regresses to a more archaic sys-
tem. Put in pathological terms, one is witness to the formation of 
split-ups of consciousness on the synchronic as well as diachronic 
level, since more than one personality or alternating personalities 
are present in the same individual. The stronger consciousness 
(which was not the only one) is weakened and extinguished: the 
personalities, the wills or the partial memories are not capable of 
living together as allies. The psychic apparatus becomes "altered" 
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and breaks up into fragments not entitled to grant mandates inside 
that very system, or to form new hegemonic coalitions. In Le Bon's 
view the unity of the "I" "is just as fictitious as that of any army" 6 
in the sense that, if the general's staff is decimated, the soldiers 
turn into bewildered, disoriented stragglers seized by panic. 
Nevertheless the split-up of the sovereign personality cannot be 
conceived as pure chaos, since "the disorganization organizes 
itself" 7 at a less complex level but organized nevertheless. Even 
in psychic life, therefore, as in politics, the crises of hegemony 
never lead to a vacuum of power, but to a dissolution of the more 
complex and unstable ties which, in turn, give rise to psychic 
syntheses that are more limited with respect to the ones reached 
previously. That which does not fall within the gravitational 
sphere of a pole of consciousness is attracted by another or wan-
ders in search of more stable connections in the psychic space of 
the sick person . 
Yet the alii that are generated from the split-up of the 
hegemonic "I" all aspire to an independent life. Not only to a 
double view, but to a multiple life. Janet in fact presents the case 
of a woman with sixteen different personalities and, in the United 
States, Morton Prince, in The Dissociation of a Personality: A Bio-
graphical Study in Abnormal Psychology (a work tied to the research 
of Janet and Binet), analyzes in detail the case of Miss Beauchamp, 
endowed with five successive personalities . 8 We should recall also 
the recent case of Billy Milligham, the first person considered not 
guilty of homicide by an American court because under the sway 
of twenty-three personalities, of which ten were permanent and 
thirteen suppressed. 9 
3. On the basis of these studies in psychopathology and their 
circulation among a cultivated but not overly specialized public, 
one is led to surmise that the "I" is a fragile construction and that 
the subject is in effect-as Levi-Strauss will later say-un pauvre 
tresor and an insupportable enfant gate.10 From this perspective, it 
seems that for thousands of years Western man has accumulated 
only an inflated patrimony and has confined himself to adoring 
a tyrannical and demanding idol. One of the strongholds of mod-
ern metaphysics is thus threatened: the very bearer of certainty 
becomes untrustworthy. If it were possible here to go over even 
schematically the centuries-old history of the theme of the central-
ity of the subject and of its subsequent fall, one would see how 
the strategic value of the notion of "subject" is tied to the weaken-
ing of the tradition and of the certainties it ushered in. The subject 
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can become a witness to truth only in an age-like the modern 
one, starting from Montaigne-in which every authority is under-
mined. Hence the value of the subject does not arise from purely 
epistemological reasons but from a crisis in the credibility of the 
objective world. As a result the subject transforms itself into an 
Atlas and an interpreter of a reality that has lost its power to 
persuade immediately. When everything vacillates, one is forced 
to seek the wherefore of things and the justifications for events 
inside one's own self; one is forced to redefine the basic evidence 
and to establish procedures of intersubjective communication and 
a definition of "objectivity," such as can be followed by virtually 
everyone so as to reach the same conclusions. 
It is just such procedures that-from Descartes to Kant-
shape retroactively the subject and thus constitute it, delineating 
the field of valid experience and the private sphere. The end-result: 
the legislative subject is in reality the product of its own proce-
dures, the guarantor of the structuring of knowing and acting. 
But every time attempts were made to see what lies hidden behind 
the procedures, so as to reveal the identity of this sovereign [sov-
rano] ordering agent of the world, it was found that nothing and 
no one lay behind. Or, better yet, that it was impossible to indi-
viduate this "X", the subject, as Kant had already called it. The 
subject makes knowledge possible but it is not knowable; it is, as 
Fichte believed, pure activity, but it cannot be intuited. French 
culture at the end of the nineteenth century seems to demonstrate 
what Schopenhauer had predicted more than half a century be-
fore, namely, that by looking within we lose ourselves in a bottom-
less pit, as if we were in an empty glass sphere. From the inside 
of this void, a voice speaks but its cause cannot be found within 
the sphere: when we are trying to grasp ourselves, we are only 
grasping with horror an inconsistent ghost. 11 Now the credibility 
crisis does not just concern the objective world, but hits the subject 
as a unitary center, as an ordering agent of the world according 
to universal procedures and structures, in its presumably transcen-
dental nature. Failing to find, at the level of mind, any point of 
support, the only guarantee of personal identity remains finally 
the "consensus" of the bodily organs, their precarious collabora-
tion which produces consciousness, a health always exposed to 
sickness and to "degeneration." 
French culture, starting with Taine, has especially insisted on 
the fragility of the "I", whose activity had been compared to that 
of a slave who, in the Roman world, had to cross a circus full of 
tired lions and sated tigers yet ever dangerous, with an egg in 
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his hand. If he succeeded, he would be set free. 12 Likewise in the 
case of the voyage of life the "I" can get to the end unscathed, 
but its integrity is a no-guarantee conquest, since it is just as fragile 
as an egg. Put in Freudian terms, one could say that the subject is 
no longer master in his own house, but is tolerated, as in Mallarme's 
Igitur, only in the guise of simple "guest." Not only has it given 
up any pretense of being the guarantor of certainty, but-again 
as with Mallarme or with Pirandello's characters-it needs to look 
into the mirror to make sure it exists. 13 
The Delphic precept "Know thyself," which from Socrates to 
Hegel represented the high point of philosophical research, is no 
longer tenable and remunerative. To be present to itself is no 
longer considered to be a presupposition of truth, and the subject 
begins to appear to many as abandoned to "existential drift." 14 
Thus, whereas the Hegelian self-consciousness evaded vicious 
infinity by returning every time into itself from its relation to 
others and could bask in the "Sundays of life" in times of rest 
and spiritual relief, at the end of the century it finds that the way 
back is blocked. And while Hegel guaranteed the enrichment of the 
personality against the dangers and the contradictions that 
threatened its integrity by orienting and synchronizing it on the 
"North star" of the overall movement of true effectual reality 
[Wircklichkeit], now no one believes any longer in the existence of 
an objective process of the world endowed with its own sense. 
Sense, order, coherence are declared products of the human will, 
survival tools of the species. 
II 
1. What theoretical strategies can we come up with in the face 
of the discovery of the fragility and dissociation of the "I"? How 
does one respond to the idea of a radical plurality that's constitu-
tive of the subject? I will here consider three symptomatic answers: 
that of Bergson, that of Nietzsche, and that of Pirandello. The prog-
ressively increasing space given to each is due solely to expository 
reasons and does not in any way imply a value judgment. 
Deeply and most directly tied to the culture of Ribot, Janet, 
and Binet, only in Bergson's case do we witness a great effort to 
escape the danger of the disintegration of the "I" and to find again 
the forgotten way that leads back to it. But this "hearth of iden-
tity" -as Ernst Bloch would call it-is difficult to reach, it is a goal 
that demands the maximum of spiritual concentration. For it is easier 
to allow oneself to live with a consciousness that is scattered and 
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reified, ever exposed to the risk of disgregation and falling into 
the ineffectual desire of other possible lives. 
In fact, the break-up of the "I" into multiple personalities is 
actually possible for each one of us, for the possible poles of 
psychic aggregation have been different throughout our existence 
and above all during our formative years. Indeed, in the course 
of our life the personality in each one of us has revolved around 
certain nuclei, around ilots de conscience which, in turn, were sub-
sequently organized into successive coalitions, into archipelagoes 
of consciousness. We have often found ourselves at the crossroads, 
we have continually discarded possibilities of development in 
other directions, we have removed or buried the potential "l's" 
that were in the making. Ours has thus been a kind of stalk-like 
growth [crescita a stelo]: every choice has been a victory over alter-
natives that prior to the decision had still a chance of becoming 
actualized. 
Every development thus comes about via dissociation, 
through alternatives and diremptions, and not just through ac-
cumulation or through harmonizing. Our present psyche is like 
a tree that preserves the scars of the pruned branches, of the 
possibilities that have been cut off. Bergson expresses this concept 
quite effectively: 
Each one of us, looking back at his own story, can notice that his 
personality as a child, indivisible though it was, still combined 
within itself different persons which could remain merged because 
they were just in the nascent state: this indecision full of promises 
is one of the major charms of childhood. But, as one grows, the 
personalities within us become incompatible, and since each one 
of us lives but one life we are forced to make a choice. In fact, we 
do choose constantly and constantly abandon many things. The 
road we travel in time is covered with the debris of all that we 
started to be, of all that which we could have become. 15 
The fact is that-as Ribot, Janet, and Binet taught and as 
Pirandello knew very well-in psychic life these choices and these 
exclusions are not definitive. Augustine's in te ipsum rede seems to 
come about in the opposite way, that is, it does not lead to the 
hearth of personal identity, to interior concentration, but rather 
to the rebirth of the plurality of the "I", to dissociation: the aban-
doned or excluded "I's" come back. As soon as the old monarch, 
the sovereign "I" that wanted to rule alone, has become weaker 
and has lost its strength, they return from the exile where they 
were banished and reinstate their own partial power. In point of 
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fact, they are not aliens, they are not strangers: it's rather a matter 
of old acquaintances which have been repudiated; acquaintances 
all too well known, but consciously or unconsciously ignored which 
have generally tried to prove their alterity in dreams or reveries, 
for they were often a disturbing [perturbante] presence for 
sovereign [egemone] consciousness. Thus they were not something 
other from us, for they already were within us, in fact they were 
us, except that before they were subordinated to a psychic hierar-
chy that afforded them little space for independence . When they 
reawake, one has the feeling of being possessed by strange powers. 
But it is still always us in the plural, in all the different personalities 
that can be formed: simultaneously present or alternating, syn-
chronic or diachronic. 
There is also a kind of regressive pleasure, a "secondary pay-off" 
in living this scission of the personality: the enormous expenditure 
of energy necessary to maintain its global hegemonic role stops, 
and desires and tendencies that had long been repressed find 
release. Other possible lives, back-up lives, get activated; lives that 
have remained latent but were never totally erased and which 
now contrast with the actual course one's own life has taken . 
The aspiration to experiment with parallel lives to one's own, 
which "normal" personalities satisfy through the reading of novels 
or historical works, or by traveling and by means of the imagina-
tion, becomes here absolute, freed as it is from any conditioning 
and reality principle. Thus, while it is culturally possible to enrich 
one's personal identity by living-as if by proxy, "morganati-
cally" -other lives parallel to our own, in the case of the patholog-
ical breakdown of the "I" the passion of being others is not directly 
linked to the passion for personal growth, or to the desire for 
psychic alliances that are more sophisticated and more respectful 
of the "otherness" of the colonial "I's." In the case of mental illness 
it is not possible to go beyond a determinate level of conflict with 
other possible personalities and to resolve it by an increase in 
complexity . The single islands of consciousness therefore act sepa-
rately and the fiction or the ineffectual desire to live several lives 
becomes psychic reality . The level of personal identity, no longer 
sustained by one unique history of life, is gauged by the degree 
of coordination of the organic functions. 
Bergson's philosophical strategy can be summed up in the 
following two moves: acceptance of the divergent development even 
in the area of consciousness and of the subject; a search for the 
secret spring from which the unity of spiritual life flows. It's the 
current of consciousness and the elan vital that guarantee in time the 
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conservation of personal identity and which sweep in a continuous 
flow the fragments of psychic life, tying them together like the 
notes of a "melody." With Bergson, the dynamism impressed by 
consciousness, the role of memory and the appeal to the phenomenon of 
"duration" serve the function of exorcising the dissolution of consciousness 
into independent entities which are foreign to one another and which 
remain "spaced out." The unity of the "I" exists solely with the 
flow, with process: if the current slows down, if "the focus on 
life" diminishes, then consciousness crumbles and the personality 
shatters. 
2. In Nietzsche also the problematic of the plurality of the "I" 
is related to that tradition of physiological and psychological re-
search mentioned above. 16 
Consequently for him also-and this is a point that must be 
emphasized-the ego is "a multipilcity of forces of a personal 
kind, out of which now one now the other come to the fore as 
ego, "17 consciousness is formed by a "multiplicity of consciousnes-
ses, "18 just like the living body in Zarathustra I is "a plurality with 
a sense, a war and peace, a flock and a shepherd" and in Beyond 
Good and Evil it is "a societal construction of many souls" 
[Gesellschaftsbau vieler Seelen).19 Likewise, man is "a plurality of 
wills-to-power: each with a plurality of forms and means of expres-
sion. "20 The difference with respect to the other positions we have 
considered lies in the fact that for Nietzsche it is the best men, 
those endowed with an overabundance of vital force, who are 
especially capable of accepting the conflict joyously, of not submit-
ting the plurality of "wills-to-power" and of "l's" which lie in 
them to a mortifying and rigid unity. At the summit of the body 
as society there is no "absolute monarch," but rather an anonym-
ous and variable force, "the barycenter, something changeable" 
[ das centrale Schwergewicht . . . etwas Wandelbares J. 21 
The hegemonic consciousness is here the result not so much 
of relatively stable coalitions, but rather of a continuous displace-
ment toward a temporary point of equilibrium, of the successive 
appearance of "forces of a personal kind." One could say that the 
disintegration [scindersi] of consciousness or the prevalence of sick-
ness in the body corresponds, more than to a state of anarchy, 
to the succession of frequent and sudden displacements of the 
center of gravity. This condition, and the complementary one of 
the rigidity of the soul and body, seems to correspond the most 
to the physical and psychic structure of the mass individual, that 
is, of those who know only how to be in the herd and are not 
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capable of being both herd and shepherds of themselves, both 
plurality and harmonizing, regenerating equilibrium in the tug-
ging of the parts, dissonant harmony. All this because, as can be 
gathered from Zarathustra' s speech in Of the Thousand and One 
Reasons, the pleasure and the inclination that men feel for the 
herd is older-and hence more powerful-than that which they 
feel for the "I." The conquest of an ego or of a self that is relatively 
stable is the end-result of a long, painful, and uninterrupted effort 
in the history of humanity and of every individual. From such a 
conflict still not resolved once and for all arises the continuous 
terror of the dissolution of the "I" and the relapse into something 
shapeless. It is just such fear that reactively reinforces the idea 
and the desire for a monolithic and substantial "I." 
3. Only the esprits forts, those who accept the eternal return, 
can escape the collective call of the species and the related fear 
of losing themselves should they abandon the herd, the "colony." 
They would be capable of taking onto themselves-without being 
destroyed-more persons [mehrere Personen] and experience the ego 
not as an "absolute monarch," but rather as a mobile center of 
gravity. At the same time, however, they do not renounce their 
selves and are faithful to the end to their own history and to their 
own decisions, without being tied to that one exclusive personality 
resulting from insecurity and the atrocities of existence. In this 
case, to lose oneself in order to gain many other "I's" means multiplying, 
not dividing, one's own powers. The overabundance of vital force, 
of "health," even gives rise to the desire for insecurity, for audac-
ity, for the voyage of discovery. In light of these considerations, 
the eternal return can be viewed as a strategy to slow down or prevent 
the disgregation of personality and of civilization, the very moment they 
are accepted as the end-product of" decadence." It is a way of unleashing 
from the dissolution all the potential liberating effects. It is as if 
one would want to refer to oneself, to a multiple identity that 
constantly changes and disintegrates, everything that has been 
[das Gewesen] by chaining it to repetition. But even to reach such 
an end-result, in fact above all because of this, one needs discip-
line, an aptitude for command and for hegemony (hegemony, 
however, which is quite different from that based on "coalitions" 
of the "I", modeled, as in Ribot, on parliamentary regimes). The 
greater freedom of the "I" depends, in fact, not on a greater 
consensus of the parts, but on a harder and cruder hierarchization 
of psychic instances that culminate-in the case of the subject-in 
the acceptance of the bond of the eternal return. The procedure 
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is similar to that practiced by the dancer or the pianist: only by 
submitting themselves to the bond of the continuous repetition of 
exercises do they obtain a greater expressive freedom and a greater 
nimbleness of the whole body or of the hands. The powers of 
pure scission are thus defeated homeopathically and can no longer 
prevail, since the personal identity is nevertheless reproduced cyclically 
within this very multiplicity and disgregation, which are wanted and not 
suffered. Thus, there exist no resentments, there are no regrets, 
there is no desire to live other parallel lives, different from one's own. 
With the thought of the eternal return, any desire of being an 
other vanishes. The time that it imposes saves and redeems every 
instant, making it meaningful. 
Paradoxically, it redeems the possibility for something new and 
paves the way for it, just like discipline in music and dance makes 
creativity possible. Only a few, however, are able to bear "the 
greater weight" of the idea of the eternal return. The majority of 
men (those adhering to the collective consciousness and those 
living ascetically and rancorously with a struggling and divided 
soul) realize with barely hidden joy the passage of time that de-
stroys everything and their vindictive spirit takes delight in the 
transience of all things. There is, however, according to Nietzsche, 
a fundamental difference in the relationship of his contemporaries 
to decadence: the man of resentment not only produces it and 
accentuates it involuntarily, but he also desires it as punishment 
destined to hit everyone, since he is the very first victim. The 
"free spirit," instead, desires the decadence because he knows that 
one cannot go backwards "like the crab" when facing the various 
demands of the times. He bends decadence back onto itself, accepting 
it to its ultimate consequences, by curving the parabola of decline 
until it reaches the circle of the eternal return. 
III 
1. Given the fact that Pirandello had gone through painful 
private experiences marked by inner turmoil, he was especially 
sensitive to the themes put forth by Binet in Les alterations de la 
personnalite. 22 From his early text Dialoghi tra il "Grande Me" e il 
"Piccolo Me" he has notoriously pushed his analyses of the break-
ing down of the "I" and of the rise of double or multiple per-
sonalities to the point of virtuosity. But, while remaining faithful 
to the conflicts and aporias that arise from the disintegration of 
the subject before oneself and others, he also wanted to explore 
the type of road that may possibly take us back to ourselves and 
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to render nonconventional forms of identity dramatically accept-
able. 
The point of departure for any search for meaning here is the 
observation that all of us are nailed to parameters of casual reality, a 
reality not chosen: "time, space, necessity" and, furthermore, 
"fate, fortune, change: all of them traps of life. "23 We cannot avoid 
being what we are, being born and growing up in a certain age, 
in a given country, the result of determinate causes or cir-
cumstances. We cannot, for example, avoid having a certain nose, 
a certain sh.ape. Society chains us to the principle of individuation 
because it wants us to be responsible for our acts and our thoughts 
(as they prefigure our actions), recognizable as belonging to spe-
cific communities. Our every act qualifies us and is ascribed to us as 
corresponding to our one and permanent "I", even though we know 
quite well that we are not wholly contained in the act that marks 
us forever. 
In judging man by a single action, no consideration is given 
to the struggle among the souls that coexist in every individual (cf., 
for example, the novels L'Ave Maria di Bobbio or Stefano Giogli, uno 
e due); a struggle that in certain instances can end up with the 
victory of a repressed personality, one judged as socially deplor-
able and beastly: 
Here is a high official who believes himself to be and indeed is, 
the poor chap, a gentleman. The moral soul prevails in him. But 
one fine day, the instinctive soul that is like a primitive beast lying 
hidden deep within each one of us, kicks over the moral soul, and 
that gentleman turns thief. Oh, he himself, poor thing, he is the 
first to manifest surprise, he cries, desperately asking himself:-
How, how could you have done this? But, yes sir, he has stolen. And 
that other one there? A good man, yes indeed, a very fine man: 
yes sir, he has murdered .... 24 
Quite rightfully society, from its point of view, condemns these 
alterations of the typical personality and constantly reinforces the 
mimetic mechanisms of identity. The moral anathema falls there-
fore on who has not restrained the "beast" and the desires for 
change that, in various ways, are pre-present in the "brain," an 
organ which is defined-in a letter of the nineteen-year-old Piran-
dello--as: "the mysterious depths of the sea populated with mon-
strous thoughts that flash and dart dangerously about." 
In accepting us into its bosom, society gives us an identifica-
tion tag, a name that already contains a story and that must stabilize 
us into a role, transform us into one individual. But the name, 
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and the permanent "I" that it should help build, are suitable only 
for dead things, not living creatures: 
A name is nothing else but an obituary epitaph. It is suitable for 
the dead, for those who are finished. I am alive and am not finished. 
Life is not over . And Life knows nothing of names either. 25 
The name is but one of the many mechanisms in the production 
of the personality. The personality and the "I" are a construction, 
whereby each one takes some material from him/herself and builds him/ 
herself. For Pirandello, as for Vico, verum ipsum factum: "we can 
only know what we can give form to." 27 The fact is, however, 
that each one gives form to himself and others in a different way. 
With similar assertions Pirandello does not invent a literary topos: 
he is already in tune with the most advanced literary and 
philosophical culture of his time. His are not baroque paradoxes, 
but epistemological problems that are vigorously debated and 
which arise from the premise according to which there exist no 
objective, ontologically guaranteed reality. Our every knowledge 
of the world is a construction or-in Marchesini' s language-a 
fiction. In itself "reality" is an unknowable limit, and, of itself, 
devoid of sense. Only our abstractions, in fact, give meaning to 
the world. But to abstractions there corresponds nothing more 
than our will to construct, the poietic act that creates them. That 
·entails, however, that they also be fragile, arbitrary, and not 
guaranteed by any recognized moral or religious authority (God 
has not died, according to Pirandello, but has aged and become 
impotent, as we read in "The Aged God" contained in his Tales 
for a Year). Human history is in danger of becoming again that 
tower of Babel to which Yahveh had, mythically, imposed law 
and order. 
To give oneself form and to emerge from the indistinct means 
to commit oneself to a form that organizes and structures. But 
behind every form there is a force, more or less intense: 
The reality that I attribute to you is embedded in the form that you 
give me; but it is a reality for you and not for me, the reality that 
you have for me is contained in the form that I give you; but that 
is what reality is for me and not for you. As for myself, I have no 
other reality than the form that I succeed in giving myself. How 
so? But precisely in constructing myself. Ah, you believe that we 
build only houses right? I build myself continuously, and you do 
likewise. And the construction lasts as long as the cement of our 
will holds up and until the material of our sentiments crumbles. 
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And do you know why such insistence on will and constancy of 
sentiments? If one wavers but slightly, the other changes also min-
imally and good-bye reality of ours! We immediately realize that it 
was nothing but our own illusion. Hence firmness of will, constancy 
of sentiments . Be strong so as not to dive into the void, so as not 
to encounter these unpleasant surprises. But what beautiful con-
structions come out! 28 
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Illusions are abandoned constructions that no longer correspond to any 
present sentiment or will and that are no longer kept together by any 
"cement." Consequently, the personality is all the more lasting the less 
the material of our sentiments "crumbles" and the more constant is our 
will to preserve them unaltered. 
Every form is both an anchor of salvation and a stock, a principle 
of individuation but also a condemnation to individuation. Being 
must be "entrapped" in its form as long as the form resists and 
must adapt to it. This entails, however, paying a price for it. 29 
But there are moments when even this anchor of salvation cannot 
hold up in the face of life's tempests, manifesting its fictional 
nature. Life and reality are in fact an indistinct flux that only for conve-
nience's sake do we subdivide into parts and place under the rule of 
abstractions. We are not talking here of the Bergsonian flux of 
consciousness, or of William James' stream of consciousness, or of 
a purifying bath of every slag, but of a kind of infernal and primi-
tive river, of ruinous flood-waves that sweep away the "houses" 
that we have so laboriously erected: 
Life is a continuous flux that we laboriously try to arrest to fix into 
stable and determinate forms, inside and outside of us, because 
we already are fixed forms! Forms that move in the midst of other 
motionless forms which, however, in following the flux of life, tum 
gradually more and more rigid, as the movement slows down and 
stops. The forms that we try to stop and fix within us in this 
continuous flux are the concepts, the ideals which we try to stick 
to, all the fictions that we create, the conditions, the kind of state 
into which we try to settle. But within us, in what we call the 
"soul" and which is the life within us, the flux continues, indistinct, 
underground, beyond the limits that we impose putting together 
a consciousness, constructing a personality. At certain stormy mo-
ments, all these fictitious forms of ours miserably fall as they are 
hit by the flux: and even what does not flow underground and 
over the banks but which is distinct to us and which we have 
carefully channeled in our affections, in the duties we have imposed 
on ourselves and in the habits we have developed, can sometimes 
tum into a flood and overwhelm us. There are restless souls almost 
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in a continuous state of fusion who refuse to set, to become rigid 
in this or that form of personality. But even for more sedate souls, 
those who have settled into one form or another, fusion is always 
possible: the flux of life is in everyone. 30 
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This rich passage has a parallel in a page from One, No One, 
One Hundred Thousand: 
It's well that you tap your ears so as not to hear the terrible clangor 
of a sure underground robbery, beyond the limits which you, like 
a good judge, have staked out and made yours in putting together 
your most scrupulous consciousness. They can collapse, you know? 
In a stormy moment like the one Ms. Anna Rosa has had. What 
robbery? Oh well, is it that of high tide, your Honor? You have 
channeled it well in your affections, in the duties you have imposed 
on yourself, in the habits you developed. But then there come 
moments of flood-tides, your Honor, and the river overflows its 
banks and overwhelms everything. I know it. All is submerged for 
me, your Honor! I dove in and now I am swimming in it, I am 
swimming in it . And if you only knew how far away I am already! 
I almost can't see you anymore. 31 
Constructing oneself is a "spontaneous interior artifice, the 
fruit of secret tendencies or of unconscious imitation." 32 Notice 
the oxymoronic expression spontaneous artifice: the construction of 
· identity is spontaneous insofar as it is unconscious and the product 
of the forces of social conditioning, but it is artificial in that it does 
not correspond to any normatively binding and rigid human na-
ture. Each one taken in and of itself is nothing, is no one: 
Do you want to be? There's this to ponder: in the abstract one is 
not. Being needs to be entrapped into a form and end up in it for 
some time, here or there, such and such . 33 
We shouldn't ignore, incidentally, Pirandello's native soil and his 
hometown customs and traditions. Agrigento is the birth-place 
of Empedocles, the philosopher of metamorphosis and of the 
cosmic conflict between neikos and philia. Agrigento is also near 
Lentini, the classical Leontini, the town of the Sophist Gorgias, 
who was capable of proving anything and its contrary. And it is 
indeed the "feeling for the contrary" [sentimento del contrario] that 
characterizes humorism 34 and more generally all of Pirandello's 
art. Vitangelo Moscarda is precisely the one 
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willing to think and feel also the contrary of what he was thinking 
and feeling just a while ago, that is, break up and dismantle every 
mental and sentimental formation by constant and contrary 
reflections. 35 
59 
These are the people more likely to experience the discovery of 
the illusions, more capable of chipping away the cement of the 
will and of throwing into disarray the various sentiments, of shak-
ing the unconscious construction that stems from imitation and 
the crystallized images that the others have formed of us. 
When this spontaneity and animal innocence of the construc-
tion going on (as with ants or termites) is discovered, then every-
thing crumbles and it becomes possible to see the "unformed," 
the chaos from which every form rises as order or protection against 
it. So whether we have the "restless souls in an almost continuous 
state of fusion," or the quiet ones "who have settled into one form 
or another" but who are shaken by some event that alters them, 
they all come to a point where they are forced to abandon every 
vital fiction. We come thus to the moment of confession: 
In certain moments of interior silence, during which our soul sheds 
all of its habitual fictions and our eyes become more acute and 
penetrating, we see ourselves within life, and life in itself, as if 
barren, disturbing [inquietante] nakedness: we are seized by a 
strange impression, as if, in a flash, a reality different from the one 
we normally perceive were revealed to us, a living reality beyond 
human sight, outside the forms of human reason. Then most lucidly 
the whole context of daily experience, almost suspended in the 
void of this interior silence of ours, appears to us devoid of sense 
and pointless; and that different reality will seem to us horrible, 
in its almost impassive and mysterious crudity, since all of our 
fictitious, concrete relations of sentiments and images have broken 
down and dissolved in it. The internal void widens, crosses the 
limits of our body, becomes emptiness around us, as if time and 
life stood still, a strange void, as if our interior silence would sink 
sweeping down into the abyss of mystery. With a supreme effort 
we try then to reacquire the ordinary consciousness of things, to 
re-establish with them the usual relations, to re-connect the ideas, 
to feel alive as before, as always. But we can no longer have faith 
in this normal consciousness, in this usual feeling of life, because 
we already know that it is one of our tricks for living and that 
underneath it all there is something else, which man can approach 
only at the risk of dying or going crazy. It was just a second, but 
its impression stays long with us: a dazzling and eerie quality which 
contrasts the stability, yet so vain, of things: ambitious or miserable 
appearances. Life, then, meandering casually and miniscule among 
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these appearances, seems no longer real to us, appearing rather 
like a mechanical phantasma?ory. Now how do you give it impor-
tance? How give it respect? 3 
60 
This great passage would call for a word-by-word comment. 
But for now at least two apparently marginal points have to be 
kept in mind. The first is that Pirandello employs the language 
of mysticism for the profane discovery of a dimension "that man 
can approach at the risk of dying or going crazy." He speaks of 
a sudden revelation, "in a flash," of a "different reality," "of a 
strange void," of a standstill of time and of life: all of them images, 
sensations and ideas which are common in the mystical ecstasy, 
in which the temporal flux is suddenly suspended and in the great 
void one becomes aware of the "numinous," the terrific. The 
second point relates to the slight importance of life and to the 
difficulty of paying it "respect" once the illusion is discovered. 
This is an element that gives an ambiguous character to all of 
culture, even the political one, during the turn of the century, 
divided as it was between the vitalistic cult of existence and the 
attraction toward death, torn between the pietas toward living 
things and pleasure, destruction and self-destruction. 
2. What is one to do after the deception has been discovered, 
. after a crack however minimal (the crooked nose of Vitangelo 
Moscarda, for example) is found in our "house," in our "spontane-
ous artifice"? A great part of Pirandello's work seems to revolve 
obsessively around this topic with a constancy and an insistence 
which lasted for decades, ranging from his earliest writings to the 
time of his death. After all it is not just a matter of a semiotic or 
esthetic problem, but of an entire sequence of existential questions: 
"I was not a person I was a bunch of personalities [personaggi}* 
in search of a person," Pirandello would confess. 37 
In the face of such discovery one can react basically in two 
ways (unless one is able to accept acritically the Jamesian Will to 
Believe and become quickly attached to other illusions once the 
preceding ones have fallen by the wayside). One way would entail 
not being anyone, that is, to use a term coined by Louis Dugas, 
"depersonalization," in being "as you want me." One then looks 
at oneself in the mirror, which is the recurrent metaphor for the 
otherness and foreignness of the identical [dell' alterita e dell' estraneita 
dell'identico]. One sees oneself as the stranger before him, the 
impossible experiment of looking at oneself as the others would 
*Personaggio means both "personality" and "character." [Tr.) 
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and do look at us (impossible because one would need an infinite 
number of mirrors, each of which would give a different image). 38 
Emptied of the sentiment of belonging, what is each individual? 
"Nothing. Nobody. A poor mortified body, waiting for someone 
to take it." 39 This is the way, in its negative view, of dying while 
living, this is the path that becomes the destiny of the many people 
who lower the threshold of their expectations for meaning and 
happiness in life to the point that, fearing further wounds and 
humiliations, prefer rather the interior void even before physical 
death. 40 But the horrible river, which sweeps away our construc-
tion, is life itself, life that cannot be frozen, cannot be "set" without 
dying innermost. When, in fact, one's own vital current is congealed, 
each one feels oneself inexorably assimilated to one's own princi-
ple of individuation, and transformed into an actor that recites a 
routine role. Without enthusiasm, and lessened to a "marionette" 
fashioned by both himself and others, the actor now looks at 
himself living. 41 It will then seem as if all that is happening around 
him has already happened (as in the psychological phenomenon 
of deja vu, symptom of a breakdown of personality under way) 
or that he himself is another person, a stranger, as in the short 
story "The Nail," in which the protagonist unintentionally kills a 
red-haired girl in New York with a nail that he had casually picked 
up in some street in Harlem. 
Pirandello had closely and personally experienced this dis-
turbing impression of seeing oneself live from the outside, like 
an automaton, and had felt already in his youth the acute sense 
of deja vu. 42 He in fact confessed later on that it often happened 
to him that when faced with people and landscapes seen for the 
first time, he knew against all evidence of having encountered them 
long before: "I have always recognized everything." 43 
The second way of confronting the discovery of the senseless-
ness and illusion of the forms of life consists in practicing the 
heroic furor of Vitangelo Moscarda, that is, in not wanting to be a 
nobody, a ghost projected from the images of others or an ephem-
eral, spontaneous construction of oneself. This way entails want-
ing to be one, but without a name; oneself, not like the others forge 
us, conditioning us, but like one wants to be once and for all: 
naked masks, divested, a la St. Francis so to speak, of all the 
external frills, of all the vanities and the illusions that no longer 
help us to live . The Pirandellian characters-like the protagonist 
of the novel When I Was Crazy, who deprives himself of all his 
goods and reads The Little Flowers of St. Francis 44-find an authen-
tic dimension only in the knowledge that it is necessary to reject 
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the unceasing flow of illusions. Paraphrasing Max Weber, one 
can say that Pirandello here suggests a kind of this-worldly-asceti-
cism [ascesi intramondana]. 
To choose for oneself means rejecting the common criteria of 
identification (name, space, time, cause), but it also means putting 
oneself outside human fellowship, it means being declared crazy 
or irresponsible, wearing a rattle-cap [berretto a sonagli], or being 
ostracized and condemned to solitude. Alternatively, as in the case 
of the Il Fu Mattia Pascal, one can change one's own name and 
reconstruct a new identity for oneself. After discovering the illu-
sions of identity, Vitangelo Moscarda declares: "I was becoming 
'one.' I. I who now wanted to be thus. I who now felt thus. 
Finally!" 45 But he quickly perceives the ice of solitude, which is 
due not so much to the fact of being deprived of the company of 
others, but rather to being deprived of a non-ephemeral (one) self. 
Even in company one can "founder" in the other's solitude. 46 
To whom can one thus turn saying "I"? What center and 
point of reference is one to take? 
When touching me, when shaking my hands, yes, I was saying 
"I" but to whom was I saying it to? And for whom? I was alone. 
Alone in the whole world. Alone for myself. And then a shiver 
that shook me to the roots of my hair, I felt eternity and the chill 
of this infinite solitude. To whom was I to say "I"? What did it 
mean to say "I" if for the others it had a sense and a value that 
could never be mine? As for me, so much outside of the others, 
to embrace a value or a sense means to plunge immediately into 
the horror of this void and of this solitude. 47 
Now one is no longer filled-as in When I Was Crazy-with all 
the other "I's" that had been internalized: 
When I was crazy I did not feel myself, which is tantamount to 
saying: I was not living in my house. I had, in fact, become a hotel 
open to all. And if I would hit my head a little, I would feel that 
there was always people lodged in there [ .... ] I could not say I, 
within my consciousness, for immediately an echo would resound: 
I, I, I, . . .. spoken by all the others. It was like having an aviary 
within me. 48 
Vitangelo Moscarda is no longer his own guest as in a hotel, but 
is now master in his own house, which, however, is empty, at least 
initially. 
And yet to be truly one, so as not to have regrets over the 
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preceding sclerotized "I", one needs to be many, "one hundred 
thousand." One has to rid oneself completely of every rigid form, 
of any inelastic determinacy whatsoever. In this case, uncertainty 
is the shelter, existential as well as economical uncertainty (to sell 
everything, to give everything away, and even to let oneself be 
robbed, as the Pirandellian "idiot" sometimes does): 
This uncertainty within me which shied away from every limit, 
from every support, and would pull back almost instinctively from 
every consistent form like the sea pulls away from the shore [ ... ] . 49 
Well, this uncertainty must be tolerated, because-besides being 
horrible-it is also liberating for those who can rise up to the 
perspective of its heights or, according to common sense, its ab-
surdities. 
But what is the essence of such a possible strategy of "liber-
ation"? It consists in fusing and rendering fiuid the determinations of 
consciousness, in abandoning every rigid principle or criterion of individu-
ation, in losing oneself so as to find oneself, in letting oneself go and in 
foundering, in de-centering and in savoring the pleasure of not having 
to labor to construct oneself any more: 
Ah, to be no longer conscious of being, like a stone, like a plant! 
Not to remember any longer even one's own name! Lying down 
here on the grass, with the hands crossed behind one's head, to 
see the blue sky with dazzling, sunfilled white clouds sailing along; 
to hear the wind up there, among the chestnut trees, roaring like 
the sea. [ ... ] Ah to lose oneself there, to lie down and abandon 
oneself, yes, in the grass, in the silence of the sky: to fill your soul 
with all that vain blueness, letting every thought, every memory 
founder! 51 
Even Dianella in The Old and the Young experiences briefly this 
tendency toward a panic fusion with nature, this serene and yet 
at the same time disturbing losing of the self: 
The surrounding silence was so astonishing and so intense and 
thoughtless was the day-dreaming of the earth and of all things, 
that she gradually felt attracted and fascinated by it. Absorbed in 
their perennial dream, some trees seemed to her burdened with 
an infinite and resigned sadness from which the wind was trying 
in vain to shake them . She perceived, in that mysterious intimacy 
with nature, the rustling of leaves, the humming of the insects, 
and she no longer felt she was living for herself: she lived for a 
moment almost unconsciously, with the earth, as if her soul had 
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become "fused" with and "con-fused" by all the things of the coun-
tryside.52 
64 
The beauty of the countryside depends on the fact that when in 
it we are outside the city, 
away from a constructed world: houses, streets, churches, squares 
are constructed, not just in the traditional sense, but also because 
one no longer lives just for the sake of living, like these plants, 
without knowing that one lives. Rather, we live for something that 
does not exist and that we put there; a something that gives sense 
and value to life: a sense, a value that here, at least in part, you 
can manage to lose, or recognize as distressing vanity . And you 
turn languid and, yes, melancholic. I understand, I understand. 
Relaxation of the nerves. A deep need of letting go. You feel a 
loosening, you abandon yourself. 53 
This de-concentration of the will from policing the "borders" 
and from the need of a rigid identity can also be perceived as a 
conversion (rather than a reinforcement) of the will itself. One need 
not then construct oneself once and for all and defend this illusion 
and this phantasm with a disproportionate expenditure of energy 
relative to its initial advantages. All one has to do is find a will 
that utilizes one's energy to construct and reconstruct oneself 
continuously, that does not literally erect palaces but, as it were, 
ever-mobile tents, that it build not buildings but ships, that it not 
enclose itself within the inexorable "prison of time" 54 which de-
stroys the eternal seeking more than that which wants to be only 
temporary. In short a will that creates time from one instant to 
the next, after having suspended its course in the terrible instant of the 
discovery of the vital illusions. Only then can personality be born 
and be able to transform itself continuously, peacefully, in its 
apparent anomaly and folly, savoring the freshness of being born 
and dying at every moment. Thus, symptomatically, ends One, 
Nobody, One Hundred Thousand, with Vitangelo Moscarda who asks 
to be locked up in the home for the old he had himself founded, 
after having relinquished all his belongings: 
The home for the old rises in the countryside in a most delightful 
place. I go out every morning at dawn, because I now want to keep 
my spirit so, dawn-fresh, with all the things as they just open up, 
that savor still of the raw of night, before the sun dries up their 
moist breath and dazzles them. Those water-filled and leaden 
clouds hanging heavily and piled up over those pale mountains 
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that make that green patch of sky still in the shadow of night appear 
larger and clearer. And here these blades of grass, they too tender 
with water, the living freshness of the banks. And that little donkey 
in the open all night, looking about with foggy eyes and snorting 
in the silence so close to him and which slowly seems to vanish as 
everything around comes into the clear with light beams striking 
the deserted and stunned fields. And the air is new. And every-
thing, moment by moment, is what it is, something coming alive 
so as to show itself [che s'avviva per apparire]. 1 immediately turn 
my eyes so as not to see anything more stop in its appearing and 
die. Only this way I can live, then. Reborn from moment to moment. 
Preventing thought from starting to work within me again and 
re-establish the void of vain constructions. The town is far away. 
Sometimes, in the calm of the sunset, the sound of bells reaches 
me. But now those bells I no longer hear within me but outside, 
pealing for themselves, perhaps vibrating with joy in their ringing 
cavity, against a beautiful blue sky filled with warm sun, between 
the chirping of swallows or in the cloudy wind, heavy and so high 
on those lofty towers. Thinking of death, praying. There are those 
who have still need of this, and the bells speak for them. I no 
longer have this need because I die every instant, I do and I am 
born anew and without memories: living and whole, no long~r in 
me, but in everything outside. 55 
3. The highest level of liberation that the Pirandellian character 
is capable of reaching is the loss of a rigid memory and of projecting 
and constructing thought. Only thus can his experience-after 
the dissolution of the illusions-rebirth at every instant and experi-
ence life as a perpetual "dawn." With such choices he avoids 
reflecting on death as the end of everything, because everything 
dies ceaselessly so as to renew itself, because that which does not 
have a definitive form can well undergo metamorphoses, but never 
be completely destroyed. Only in this way can it enjoy the coming 
alive of appearance and be able to transform illusion from a baroque symbol 
of transience into a splendid iridescence of phenomena, in the silent yet 
expressive voice of all being. The price is high: voluntary segrega-
tion from the social context, a regression from all the conquest of 
civilization (in the double sense of the city and of citizenship, 
insofar as pertaining to a human fellowship), a desire to no longer 
live within oneself, a "vegetal" need-symptomatically acute also 
in D' Annunzio-of becoming plants or stones and to tum one's 
back on consciousness. 
The supreme theoretical virtuosity consists here again in 
changing the signs of the transience and disgregation of consciousness, 
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in accepting them together as instruments not of pain and lacer-
ation, but rather of a joy that is not of this civilization or at any rate 
contrary to every rule of human co-existence. One accepts decadence 
in its most disturbing nucleus in the idea that at the basis of 
everything there is primitive and frightening chaos, which one cannot 
look at-as if a Gorgon or a Medusa head-"without dying or 
going crazy." The consequence is thus drawn that all forms, all the 
structures of order, are stratagems, artificial constructions of civilization 
produced by the animal man, for whom it is necessary to believe in order 
to live, but on which-once put on guard by some collective or 
individual trauma-one can no longer seriously put faith in. 
If this principle is admitted-which looked at retrospectively 
turns out to be, for us, the most profound assumption that is 
common to the entire culture we have examined-we usher in 
every project attempting to give meaning to a world that has been 
declared to be constitutionally without it, a potent corrosive, a nihilis-
tic generator of entropy. That is why-staying within these prem-
ises-one can escape in the various ways, among others, we have 
examined: Bergson's solution of overtaking in time [battere sul tempo] 
the forces of dissociation, reinforcing the dynamic unity of con-
sciousness in its flow and channeling, through memory and the 
elan vital, whatever tends to scatter. Nietzsche's solution of saying 
yes to life and wanting ourselves eternally in the splendor of appearances, 
in the "great midday." Or Pirandello's solution of adhering substan-
tially to the "feeling of the contrary" and to the varied and detailed 
analysis of the struggle of souls present in each individual. Piran-
dello alludes to forms of conciliation which presuppose, from an 
artistic point of view, a departure from society and the mystical 
dimension, but which are ever ensnared by an unconcealed attrac-
tion for that infernal current the sight of which can make one die 
or go crazy. 
It is a whole culture that experiences the setback of the principle 
of individuation, a principle whose mechanism appears jammed, 
no longer capable of offering to the individual a network of mean-
ings with which to orient himself. Le Bon used to say that the 
revolutions that begin are nothing more, in reality, than beliefs 
that have ceased. 56 What ceases here is the belief in the naturalness 
and stability of the "I", and, also, for a great number of people, 
the belief in an eternity beyond the time of one's individual life. 
The search for meaning, which religion projected into an infinite 
duration, becomes now problematically contracted in the most 
sensitive expressions of contemporary consciousness: the indi-
vidual discovers a death, a pain, a sickness, a loss of meaning not 
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ransomed by any sort of remuneration. The distinction between 
time and eternity being abolished, time appears now as irrevocable 
destruction and eternity like a mystical instant of suspension of 
time which one would like to prolong forever even though fully 
aware of the futility of his effort. So as to exit from such a mournful 
state of mind and to restore "dignity" to life and meaning to 
existence, one experiments thus with various ways of escaping. 
Besides those we have considered here, one may recall, 
among others, the rebirth of Platonic realism in mathematics, in 
logic, and in the philosophy of essences [Wesenheiten]of Russell 
and Husserl toward the end of the nineteenth century and the 
first decades of our century. Or the restoration of ontology (for 
example, Nicolai Hartmann, Heidegger, and the late Lukacs) as 
an attempt to give consistence to "being," to rekindle the trust in 
the event [Ereignis] which is not "imperscrutability" or chaos, and 
finally the attempt to rid "becoming" of its irremediably horren-
dous character . From this perspective hermeneutics itself seems 
like a controlled consummation of tradition, a slow fading of the ap-
parati of sense . By means of a de-construction or of the Verwindung, 
hermeneutics too seeks, in fact, to extract energy from the dissolu-
tion of the previous ties, of surviving with whatever remains of 
a collapse. And with our present-day projects focused on the 
redistribution of sense, we are still feeling today, in small doses, the 
after-effects of this shock. 
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